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The objective of this paper is to explore the effects of glo-
balization on the labour market and social stratification. It
is generally held that globalization will bring about progress
for nations and people. This, however, is far from clear, since
the experience of almost two decades has been raising in-
creasing doubts about the potential net gains and, particu-
larly, the distribution of such gains. Clearly, there are win-
ners and losers among both countries and people. We will
concentrate on the effects upon people within countries and
refer only to one region: Latin America. Our aim is to iden-
tify winners and losers in the globalization process and, par-
ticularly, the impact on social stratification. Is globalization
leading towards greater social integration within nations, or
is social disintegration the result (because only some groups
are being integrated, while a majority is progressively ex-
cluded)? To analyse this issue, the paper is structured into
four parts. The first looks at globalization as an integral part
of a policy compact, since it is necessary to consider the
impact of the whole package rather than trying to isolate
partial effects. The second concentrates on the effects on
employment, incomes and equity. The third explores changes
in the social structure associated with some of the main pro-
cesses accompanying globalization. Lastly, we draw some
conclusions about the social structure of Latin America dur-
ing the reform period.
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I
Globalization as part
of a policy compact
Globalization in a restricted sense refers to major
changes in trade, finance and information that have
taken place in the international economy. This process
has not happened in isolation, but as an integral part of
a policy package combining internal adjustment mea-
sures with changes in the way countries relate to the
international economy. Three main processes charac-
terize the emerging situation: globalization,
privatization and deregulation (Tokman, 1997). The
policy compact followed by most countries, at least in
Latin America, came to be known after 1989 as the
“Washington Consensus” (Williamson, 1990).
Globalization means that national economies are
now more integrated with the international economy
and that goods, capital and communications, and also
people, are closer together today than ever before in
the past. This has been the result both of the opening
up of economies and of rapid technological change.
Trade and financial liberalization has come about
through reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers re-
sulting from i) multilateral agreements in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the cre-
ation of its successor, the World Trade Organization
(WTO); ii) new or reactivated integration schemes, such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the South American free trade association known
as Mercosur; iii) an explosion of bilateral trade agree-
ments during recent years; and, most importantly,
iv) unilateral tariff reductions as a key component of
the adjustment policy package. Latin American tariffs
decreased from an average of between 35% and 100%
(minimum and maximum rates) in 1985 to between
14% and 22% in the early 1990s. Diversification of the
tariff structure has also been greatly reduced, and is
now limited in most countries to three or fewer tariff
categories (Tokman, 1999).
Globalization opens up new opportunities for
growth and job creation, but at the same time affects
the determinants of employment and wages and requires
regulation to prevent unfair international competition.
A preliminary version of this paper was prepared at the request
of UNDP as a contribution to the Human Development Report, 1999.
For example, given the differences in factor endow-
ment, it is expected that trade from developing to de-
veloped countries will largely consist of goods whose
production involves intensive use of unskilled labour.
This could increase the demand for workers of this type
and decrease the gap between the wages of skilled and
unskilled labour.
If this came about, though, it could combine with
the differences in remuneration and labour regulations
that obtain between countries to generate trade expan-
sion based on unfair labour practices or increased ex-
ploitation of workers. The prospect has sparked an in-
ternational discussion about how this outcome can be
avoided and whether there is a need for additional regu-
lation. While there has been no general agreement on
how to proceed, it is clear that nobody postulates the
equalization of wages between countries, since this
would affect the competitive position of developing
countries. Nor is it accepted that trade expansion should
be based on labour exploitation. Trade sanctions for
those who do not comply with minimum international
labour standards have been mooted, but so far the idea
has been ruled out because of the danger of their being
misused as an instrument of trade protection. There is,
however, more general agreement about the need for
national and international monitoring to ascertain
whether economic progress is being accompanied by
social progress and, particularly, by compliance with
basic labour standards among all trading partners. This
has been incorporated into the International Labour
Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, adopted
by the International Labour Conference on 18 June
1998.
Globalization also affects the determinants of job
creation and wages because in open economies the abil-
ity to compete becomes a major factor and places con-
straints on wage adjustments. There now has to be a
closer link between wages and productivity than there
was in the old economic environment. In closed econo-
mies, wage increases in excess of productivity growth
can be transferred to prices, resulting in inflation; in
open economies, the outcome is a reduced capacity to
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compete. In addition, demand fluctuations mean that
companies have to be able to adapt faster and show
greater flexibility in production and labour processes.
Privatization is the second feature of the new eco-
nomic environment. Privatization reduces the size and
functions of government and increases the importance
of the private sector and markets in the management
and allocation of resources. Public-sector employment
naturally falls, rationalization by the new owners re-
duces total employment and public-sector enterprises
are transferred to national or international capitalists,
the main motive being the need to reduce budget defi-
cits during adjustment. Increasingly, furthermore, re-
sponsibility for investment is transferred to the private
sector and public investment is limited to basic infra-
structure and social sectors, with growing private-sec-
tor involvement in the execution and management of
these.
Deregulation is the third process in this new envi-
ronment. This has meant reducing protection and gov-
ernment intervention in trade, finance and labour mar-
kets. As was mentioned earlier, trade and financial
liberalization are leading to increased globalization,
while product and labour market protection is being
reduced in order to increase economic efficiency and
enable markets to play a greater role in the allocation
of resources. The deregulation process has in part been
driven by substantial legal reforms, but there has also
been a considerable de facto increase in flexibility
brought about by the unfettered operation of markets.
The threefold process of globalization,
privatization and deregulation is occurring in an inter-
national environment characterized by “universaliza-
tion” of economic and social problems and by increased
ideological homogeneity. Today, employment problems
and social exclusion are no longer to be found solely in
developing countries, but constitute a major challenge
even in the more developed economies of the world.
Unemployment in some of the industrialized countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is stubbornly high; more than 30
million people are officially classified as unemployed,
while a further 10 million are no longer actively seek-
ing work (OECD, 1994 and ILO, 1996). The average rate
of unemployment exceeds 10% and in the case of some
vulnerable groups, like young people, one in five is
jobless in many countries. The end of the Cold War
broke down ideological barriers, and today’s conflicts
are caused less by ideological divergence and more by
local interests or by a natural reaction against the so-
cial cost of adjustment.
The three processes are interrelated in both practi-
cal and analytical terms. On the analytical side, global-
ization could not have advanced had it not been accom-
panied by the other components of adjustment that
reduced trade protection, as well as by financial liberal-
ization and privatization with all the opportunities these
opened up for increased trade, capital flows and foreign
direct investment. All these policies contributed to the
attainment of macroeconomic balance, but they were also
necessary conditions for integration into the world
economy. These sets of policies were fully incorporated
into the Washington Consensus, together with instru-
ments designed to help secure fiscal discipline. The lat-
ter were included with the main objective of ensuring
price stability, but they also play an important role in
creating incentives for capital inflows in a framework of
greater stability. Indeed, the one thing that has not been
liberalized is the movement of unskilled workers. Some
retrospective policies regularizing illegal migration have
been introduced, but closed borders, or at least tight regu-
lation of flows, continue to be the rule.
The recent economic history of Latin American
countries shows that, in practice, globalization has been
accompanied by privatization and deregulation. The
timing and policy mix has varied according to country
and it is perhaps premature to evaluate the results. Only
five countries –Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and
Uruguay– have attained a per capita income level higher
than in the pre-crisis period. Even fewer have achieved
a high and sustained rate of growth, Chile and Colom-
bia being the only countries that have been able to ex-
pand at more than 5% a year for four consecutive years.
Growth rates have been erratic and stop-go cycles have
been the norm. In addition, other factors have influ-
enced performance. Initial conditions were different in
each country: some started the reform process early,
others only in the late 1980s or early 1990s. The policy
mix at each stage was also different.
In spite of the differences, after a decade and a
half of adjustment it can be concluded that all Latin
American countries have been involved in the global-
ization and adjustment process, and that privatization
and deregulation have been an integral part of the policy
compact. The results are still unclear and policy instru-
ments are continually evolving, but it is plain that the
region is today more open and integrated into the world
economy, more privatized and less regulated than it was
before 1980. All these things have happened simulta-
neously; hence, any analysis of results should take ac-
count of the context. This is what we shall do in the
rest of this paper.
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II
Employment, incomes and equity under globalization
2. The results in practice
a) Productivity gains and international competitive-
ness
The first of the expected outcomes that is actually ob-
served in most countries is productivity growth in trad-
able sectors, particularly manufacturing industry. As
will be seen below, this outcome is associated with a
reduction in the employment level of the sector. During
the 1990s, productivity per employee expanded at an-
nual rates of between 5% and 7% in Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico and Peru, while the rate was about 3% in Chile.
The effects on international competitiveness vary
depending on the country studied and the indicators
used to measure labour costs. It is usually argued that
overpriced labour can affect access to international
markets, and in a more competitive environment costs
do indeed matter. Overpriced labour can be the result
of higher wages or high non-wage labour costs or both.
The situation in most Latin American countries does
not seem to justify the priority given to this issue (ex-
cept for some necessary adjustments).
Although they have recently recovered somewhat,
wages in most Latin American countries are still lower
than in 1980. Minimum wages were 26% lower on av-
erage in 1999 than in 1980, but wages in manufactur-
ing industry rose by 2.9% in the same period. Non-
wage labour costs vary from country to country, ranging
from 38% to 64% of wages. In the case of Chile and
Argentina, non-wage labour costs are higher than in
Korea, similar to those of the United States, and much
lower than those prevailing in European OECD coun-
tries. Hourly labour costs in Latin American manufac-
turing industry range from US$ 2.10 to US$ 6.50; this
is between one third and one eighth of the United States
level and less even than in the South-East Asian coun-
tries. Labour cost differences per unit of output are
smaller due to higher productivity in competing
countries (table 1). This shows what a high priority has
to be given to raising productivity, as opposed to merely
cutting costs, if competitiveness is to be improved
(Tokman and Martínez, 1999).
The fact that relative labour costs are not high does
not mean there is no scope for making adjustments to
the labour cost structure to reduce them further and,
1. The effects anticipated
Globalization is expected to have two main effects on
labour and incomes. Firstly, productivity gains, particu-
larly in tradable sectors, should result in increased em-
ployment and lower prices in those sectors. The latter
should also result in improved real incomes and wel-
fare for the population. Secondly, increased wages in
export sectors, assumed to be more intensive in un-
skilled labour, should result in a reduction of wage dif-
ferentials by skill level and, hence, in increased equity.
The reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers should lead to a fall in the relative prices
of tradable goods. This would result, on the production
side, in factors being reallocated to export sectors and,
on the consumption side, to expenditure being reallo-
cated to imported goods and services. Consequently,
there should be a positive effect on employment result-
ing from export growth, while reductions in the rela-
tive prices of importable goods should lead to an in-
crease in real incomes. Trade liberalization should
therefore result in increased welfare.
In the short run, however, the employment growth
resulting from increased exports could be offset by a
decrease in employment in sectors that compete with
imports. Increased competition in these sectors forces
enterprises to increase productivity, generally at the ex-
pense of employment. The net employment effect of
economic opening will depend on the demand for
labour in both tradable and non-tradable sectors and
on labour supply dynamics. This, in turn, will affect
average wages in each sector.
Another anticipated result of trade liberalization
is that it will lead to a rise in the relative prices of de-
veloping country goods whose production involves in-
tensive use of unskilled labour. This would lead to an
increase in the demand for unskilled workers and a rise
in their relative wages. As a consequence, wage dis-
persion would diminish.1
1
 For a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this expecta-
tion and its empirical validity in developed countries see, among
others, Bhagwati and Dehejia (1993), Lawrence and Slaughter
(1993), Wood (1994), ILO (1995) and Sachs and Shatz (1994).
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particularly, to lower the cost of unskilled labour. Taxes
on unskilled workers tend to reduce employment, while
some of the existing taxes on the wage bill would be
more efficient if they were transferred to other sources
of revenue, particularly those that go to finance housing
or other investments.
The evolution of labour costs in the 1990s also
throws up other policy issues for consideration. Labour
costs deflated by consumer prices have not increased
ahead of productivity, for instance, in Argentina, Bra-
zil, Mexico or Peru, and have thus been no impedi-
ment to increased access to international markets. How-
ever, when expressed in dollars rather than local
currency, or when observed in relation to producer
prices, the gains are slighter, and in most cases com-
petitiveness has declined (table 1). This is due to the
effects of macroeconomic policy during the period, as
in most countries this involved national currencies
being kept overvalued owing to the need to reduce in-
flation and to the liberalization of capital flows. Part of
the decline is explained by delays in adjusting the
exchange rate.
Meanwhile, domestic prices adapt at differing
speeds to a more competitive economic environment:
prices for traded goods, generally included in producer
prices, adjust relatively quickly, while those for consumer
goods, which are more influenced by non-traded goods
and services, tend to be slower in adjusting. The result is
that while labour costs expressed in consumer price terms
did not rise, they actually increased very fast in relation
to producer prices. This change in relative prices, while
it lies outside the labour market sphere, does influence
the dynamics of wage determination because it leads to
the outlook of workers (based on the purchasing power
of wages) diverging from that of those who operate busi-
nesses (based on profit margins).
Furthermore, as the situation after mid-1997 clearly
illustrates, competitiveness is also dependent on devel-
opments in other countries. Despite a rise of between
0.4% and 10% in the competitiveness of Latin Ameri-
can countries, their ability to compete with goods from
the Asian countries deteriorated. Competitiveness gains
in these countries were about 50% –ranging from 20%
in Thailand to 60% in Malaysia– while among Latin
American countries the largest increase, in Colombia,
was about 10%.
To sum up, productivity grew, as expected, as a con-
sequence of the reform process, but some adjustments
are still needed. Firstly, if international competitiveness
is to be maintained, non-wage labour costs need to be
examined. Secondly, macroeconomic policies, particu-
larly overvalued exchange rates and relative prices,
should be reviewed. Lastly, productivity gains have been
insufficient to close the gap with competitors.
b) Job creation
A second effect of globalization has been inadequate
job creation in relation to the rapid increase in the eco-
nomically active population (EAP). On average, the non-
agricultural EAP has grown by over 3% a year, partly as
a result of increasing female participation in the wage
economy (table 2). Job creation has lagged due to slow
TABLE 1
Selected countries: Labour costs and international competitivenessa
Hourly Non-wage Hourly cost Labour costs Annual changes 1990-1995
wage labour costs of labour per unit of Labour Produc- Competitivenessb(dollars)  as % of wages  (dollars) output costs tivity
(United States = 100) A B A B C
Argentina 4.6 42.5 6.5 55 -2.0 13.1 7.0 9.2 -6.1 3.7
Brazil 3.7 58.2 5.9 60 2.9 8.5 7.5 4.5 -0.9 4.3
Chile 2.5 38.0 3.5 43 4.3 9.4 3.2 -1.1 -5.7 5.9
Mexico 1.9 42.0 2.8 47 1.2 1.5 5.2 4.0 3.6 na
Peru 1.3 64.3 2.1 43 5.1 11.6 6.6 1.4 -4.5 0.3
United States 12.6 40.3 17.7 100 2.6 3.8 -1.2 na
Germany 16.1 78.5 28.7 150 2.1 1.8 -0.3 na
Republic of Korea 6.8 21.9 8.2 60 3.6 11.9 8.0 50.0
Source: Tokman and Martínez (1999), ILO (1998) and updating by authors.
a Manufacturing industry, circa 1997. Competitiveness is defined as the difference between changes in productivity and labour costs.
b A = Changes in local currency at constant prices, deflated by consumer price index (1990-1995).
B = Changes in dollars (1990-1995).
C = Changes in dollars between July 1997 and June 1998.
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and erratic economic growth. The result has been ris-
ing unemployment.
The average unemployment rate in Latin America
rose from 6% in 1980 to 8.7% in 1983, i.e., during the
first phase of adjustment. Unemployment fell from 1983
to 1992, but never returned to its 1980 level. After 1992
unemployment grew continuously, reaching 8.8% in
1999. These developments reveal not only the limited
capacity of the region’s economies to bring down un-
employment, but also increased vulnerability, since con-
tinuous adjustments entail a return to previous higher
levels of unemployment. By 1999, Latin American un-
employment had returned to the high levels of the mid-
1980s.
Four aspects should be taken into account in evalu-
ating the way unemployment affects the people of Latin
America. The first is that it can be misleading simply
to compare the unemployment level with, for instance,
the rates of over 10% prevailing in some OECD coun-
tries. Most countries lack unemployment insurance, and
protection is generally occupation-linked. Joblessness
means no income and no protection, and this is one of
the main sources of social exclusion. Secondly, unem-
ployment disproportionately affects women and young
people. While the female unemployment rate is about
30% higher than the average, rates for young people
are usually double the national figure. Unsurprisingly,
women and young people account for a large propor-
tion of the excluded. Thirdly, there are also large re-
gional variations within countries. Adjustment tends to
have a disproportionate effect on places where key sec-
tors in need of restructuring are located. These activi-
ties generally constitute the main source of employ-
ment and production, and restructuring affects the
whole region.
The situation also differs from country to country.
Size, the degree of modernization attained and the stage
reached in the reform process are determining factors
in unemployment. Small, open economies are more vul-
nerable to external fluctuations and tend to have higher
and more erratic unemployment rates than larger, more
closed economies (where internal demand plays the
biggest role and provides more autonomy). Again, in
countries that have reached an advanced stage of ur-
banization and modernization, labour markets mainly
adjust through unemployment, while in those with a
TABLE 2
Latin America: Economic activity, employment, wages and poverty


















Percentage of households in poverty (%)
Urbanization of poverty (%)
Source: ILO, on the basis of national statistics.
a Annual growth rates. d Index 1980 = 100.
b Percentage of urban employment. e 1997 figure.
c Percentage of total EAP.
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
… 0.6 1.9 2.9 0.0
… -1.6 -0.1 1.1 -1.8
… 134.8 487.5 287.5 9.8
… 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8
… 3.5 3.1 2.6 2.6
66.9 70.0 72.8 75.3 76.6
… 3.5 4.4 3.0 2.8
6.7 10.1 8.0 7.2 8.8
40.2 47.0 44.4 46.5 48.5
15.7 16.6 15.5 13.4 13.0
100.0 93.1 86.6 92.9 102.9
100.0 86.4 68.4 70.8 73.8
35.0 37.0 41.0 38.0 36.0
71.4 … 85.4 84.2 83.3e
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large agricultural population or small formal sector, un-
deremployment is the main adjustment variable. Lastly,
the stage reached in the reform process also matters.
Early reformers have been the most successful in re-
ducing unemployment, while latecomers –particularly
those that are now in the early phases of adjustment–
tend to have higher and rising unemployment.
c) Changes in the employment structure
In addition to a higher unemployment rate, reform has
brought about profound changes in the structure of em-
ployment. Four main interrelated processes can be iden-
tified: privatization, the shift from goods-producing sec-
tors to services, the increase in informal working, and
the loss of job security. These processes can be seen to
have taken place in the 1990s, when most countries
were already beyond or well advanced in the adjust-
ment process.
Privatization introduced a major change in patterns
of job creation in Latin America, owing to the role tra-
ditionally played by the public sector as the employer
of last resort (something that will be discussed in the
next section) and an important contributor to the de-
velopment of the middle classes. Government did not
directly contribute to employment growth in the 1990s.
On the contrary, its share of urban employment fell in
the region as a whole, from 15.5% in 1990 to 13.0% in
1999. This decrease does not include falls in public-
sector employment that took place in earlier periods,
as in Chile. This movement from public- to private-
sector employment occurred in all countries, while in
some –including Argentina, Costa Rica and Panama–
the decline amounted to as much as five to ten percent-
age points.
The employment shift from the public to the pri-
vate sector was a direct consequence of the privatization
and deregulation processes accompanying globaliza-
tion. State enterprises were transferred to the private
sector and government functions were reduced. It was
also one of the main results of fiscal discipline, an im-
portant component of stabilization policy. Budget defi-
cits were generally reduced by cutting public expendi-
ture, mostly the payroll, through a series of wage and
employment cuts (table 3).
Generally speaking, however, the transfer of jobs
was not towards larger private companies. Their share
of total employment also declined over the same pe-
riod, although at a slower pace than government em-
ployment. Between 1990 and 1998, the employment
share accounted for by such companies fell from 40%
to 39%, the bulk of this decline taking place in coun-
tries such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. If small
enterprises are excluded, furthermore, the decline
amounts to two percentage points (ILO, 1998). Large
enterprises (more than 100 employees) were the most
affected by trade liberalization and the need to increase
productivity (mostly through employment reduction).
Only 17 out of every 100 new jobs created during the
1990s were contributed by such companies. Increased
labour flexibility facilitated adjustment, but at the cost
of a more erratic employment level, as is clearly illus-
trated by the 1% decline in employment in large and
medium-sized enterprises in 1998, when these firms
had to adjust to increased competition from Asian prod-
ucts (figure 1).
The second of the processes referred to, the shift
in employment from goods-producing sectors to ser-
vices, was rapid in countries such as Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay, where the share of manu-
facturing employment fell by between four and six per-
centage points during the 1990s.
In other countries the process was slower because
restructuring was at a more mature stage (Chile) or a
gradual approach was followed (Brazil and Colombia)
or, in cases like Panama, because the economy was
small and already open.
The new structural conditions resulting from the
adjustment process have left these sectors more vul-
nerable to changes in competition. Manufacturing in-
dustry contracted in 1998 as a result of increased com-
petition from Asian products. This contraction of output
and employment was particularly large in food process-
ing, textiles and clothing, shoes and machinery and
equipment.
The shift of employment from manufacturing to
services is partly the result of increased competition in
a more open economy. Falling employment has been
accompanied by rising productivity which, particularly
in the short run, can only be achieved by cutting jobs.
The effect has mainly been felt in urban employment,
since agriculture, fishing and mining tend to contrib-
ute to employment growth during the liberalization
process.
It cannot automatically be assumed that employ-
ment growth in the service sector means a shift towards
low-productivity jobs. Some of the jobs created in the
sector are in services that are integral to the modern-
ization and globalization processes, such as finance,
communications and trade. The productivity of these
sectors is usually higher than that of manufacturing and
can grow more rapidly. Unfortunately, this has not been
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TABLE 3
Latin America: Structure of urban employment, 1990 and 1998
(Percentages)
Country and years Informal sector Formal sector
Total Own-account Domestic Micro- Total Public Small, medium-




1990 Total 44.4 23.4 5.7 15.2 55.6 15.5 40.1
Male 41.2 22.8 0.5 17.9 58.8
Female 49.2 24.4 14.1 10.7 50.8
1998 Total 47.9 24.7 6.9 16.3 52.1 13.0 39.1
Male 45.0 24.9 0.6 19.6 55.0
Female 52.0 24.4 16.0 11.6 48.0
Argentina
1990 Total 52.0 27.5 5.7 18.8 48.0 19.3 28.7
Male 49.8 28.2 0.5 21.2 50.2
Female 55.5 26.5 14.3 14.7 44.5
1998 Total 49.3 22.7 6.4 20.3 50.7 12.7 38.0
Male 48.0 24.1 0.3 23.6 52.0
Female 51.4 20.4 15.8 15.2 48.6
Brazil
1990 Total 40.6 20.3 6.9 13.5 59.4 11.0 48.4
Male 36.1 19.6 0.5 16.0 63.9
Female 47.6 21.3 16.7 9.6 52.4
1998 Total 46.7 23.2 9.5 14.0 53.3 9.3 44.0
Male 43.0 25.1 1.0 16.8 57.0
Female 51.9 20.4 21.4 10.1 48.1
Chile
1990 Total 37.9 20.9 5.4 11.7 62.1 7.0 55.1
Male 33.5 21.3 0.2 12.0 66.5
Female 45.9 20.1 14.7 11.1 54.1
1998 Total 37.5 18.5 5.1 13.9 62.5 7.2 55.3
Male 32.9 19.2 0.1 13.6 67.1
Female 44.8 17.4 13.1 14.3 55.2
Colombia
1990 Total 45.7 24.1 2.0 19.5 54.3 9.6 44.7
Male 45.1 22.6 0.1 22.3 54.9
Female 46.6 26.3 5.0 15.2 53.4
1998 Total 49.0 28.1 2.1 18.8 51.0 8.2 42.8
Male 49.2 28.4 0.2 20.7 50.8
Female 48.8 27.7 4.7 16.4 51.2
Costa Rica
1990 Total 41.2 18.9 5.8 16.4 58.8 22.0 36.8
Male 37.7 19.1 0.3 18.3 62.3
Female 47.5 18.6 15.8 13.1 52.5
1998 Total 45.4 17.5 6.0 21.9 54.6 17.0 37.6
Male 42.2 16.5 0.3 25.3 57.8
Female 50.7 19.0 15.4 16.2 49.3
Ecuador
1990 Total 55.6 35.4 5.0 15.3 44.4 18.7 25.7
Male 51.7 32.6 0.7 18.4 48.3
Female 62.1 39.9 12.1 10.1 37.9
1998 Total 58.6 33.0 6.1 19.5 41.4 14.8 26.6
Male 54.5 28.9 1.0 24.6 45.5
Female 64.1 46.7 9.4 8.0 35.9
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)
Country and years Informal sector Formal sector
Total Own-account Domestic Micro- Total Public Small, medium-




1990 Total 57.6 37.3 7.1 13.3 42.4 14.9 27.5
Male 45.1 25.7 0.5 18.9 54.9
Female 72.0 50.5 14.6 6.9 28.0
1998 Total 57.9 37.0 5.0 15.9 42.1 10.3 31.8
Male 52.0 27.9 0.9 23.2 48.0
Female 64.1 46.7 9.4 8.0 35.9
Mexico
1990 Total 47.5 25.0 5.1 17.3 52.5 25.0 27.5
Male 46.6 25.1 0.8 20.7 53.4
Female 48.8 24.6 13.4 10.8 51.2
1998 Total 49.6 24.9 4.8 19.8 50.4 21.7 28.7
Male 48.1 23.7 0.2 24.2 51.9
Female 51.8 26.8 12.9 12.1 8.2
Panama
1990 Total 36.0 19.8 7.9 8.3 64.0 32.0 32.0
Male 34.6 23.8 1.0 9.7 65.4
Female 38.0 14.0 17.8 6.3 62.0
1998 Total 38.5 21.5 6.9 10.1 61.5 21.8 39.7
Male 35.9 22.8 1.3 11.9 64.1
Female 42.3 19.5 15.4 7.4 57.7
Perud
1990 Total 52.7 33.4 4.9 14.5 47.3 11.6 35.7
Male 46.3 28.9 0.6 16.9 53.7
Female 62.9 40.4 11.6 10.8 37.1
1998 Total 53.7 30.2 5.5 18.0 46.3 7.2 39.1
Male 45.3 23.8 0.5 21.0 54.7
Female 64.6 38.7 11.9 14.0 35.4
Uruguaye
1990 Total 39.1 18.6 6.8 13.7 60.9 20.1 40.8
Male 33.7 18.6 0.2 15.0 66.3
Femae 46.6 18.5 16.2 11.8 53.4
1998 Total 41.2 20.1 7.5 13.6 58.8 16.8 42.0
Male 37.3 22.1 0.2 15.0 62.7
Female 46.4 17.5 17.2 11.7 53.6
Venezuela
1990 Total 38.6 22.3 3.9 12.4 61.4 22.3 39.1
Male 38.3 22.0 0.4 15.9 61.7
Female 39.3 22.8 10.4 6.1 60.7
1998 Total 43.0 28.9 4.7 9.4 57.0 19.0 38.0
Male 43.3 27.8 0.2 15.3 56.7
Female 46.6 28.4 11.4 6.8 53.4
Source: ILO estimates, based on country household surveys and other official sources (revised series).
a
 Includes own-account workers (other than professional and technical workers) and unpaid family workers.
b
 Employed in establishments of up to five workers.
c





the situation in Latin America in the recent past. Nine
out of every ten new jobs created in the 1990s were in
services, but 70% of these were in low-productivity
services, chiefly personal, retail trade and transporta-
tion services in the informal sector. Under these cir-
cumstances, the shift to services means a decline in
employment quality.
The third major change in the employment struc-
ture in the 1990s was the shift from formal to informal
employment. As was mentioned earlier, the limited job
creation capacity of the formal economy, both public
and private, left increasing numbers of people with no
alternative but to find or create their own occupations
in the informal sector; in the absence of insurance, un-
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employment is a luxury that very few can afford. Slow
and erratic growth, and the shedding of labour by the
public sector during adjustment, conspired against the
creation of jobs in modern activities.
As a result, the proportion of the workforce in
informal employment expanded from 44% to 48%
between 1990 and 1998. This includes own-account
work, unpaid work in family businesses, domestic ser-
vice and microenterprise (less than 5 employees). Only
in Argentina, Chile and Honduras did informal employ-
ment not expand as a share of the total, while in the
remaining countries informal employment grew twice
as fast as total non-agricultural employment.
In the region as a whole, 61 out of every 100 jobs
created in the 1990s were informal. As was mentioned
earlier, the great majority of new jobs in services were
informal; furthermore, the most dynamic component
of informal employment growth has been work in
microenterprises. Of every 10 new informal jobs, more
than three were contributed by microenterprises (figure 1).
This could suggest a positive change within informal
employment, since microenterprises are more highly
organized than most informal activities and average
incomes from microenterprises are higher than those
of the rest of the informal sector, although not as high
as those of the formal sector. Average incomes in
microenterprises are about 90% of average incomes in
modern activities generally, but only 55% of average
incomes in medium-sized and large enterprises.
Nevertheless, microenterprises are increasingly of-
fering valid employment options. In 1998, for instance,
they accounted for all new jobs created. Further analy-
sis is needed, however, since although incomes are better,
working conditions, job stability and social protection
are far from being acceptable. Between 65% and 95%
of those working in microenterprises do not have a
written contract, and between 65% and 80% are not
covered for health risks or old age. They tend to work
longer hours and are more likely to have accidents at
work. Breaches of basic labour rights (child labour, free-
dom of association, collective bargaining and forced
labour) are also more frequent in establishments of this
size than in larger ones. Of course, insecurity is not
solely a characteristic of small enterprises; it is also to
be found in medium-sized and large firms (ILO, 1998).
The fourth process identified is the loss of job se-
curity resulting from increased competition in a more
flexible labour environment. The search for cost reduc-
tions and flexibility to allow for improvements in com-
petitiveness has led to labour law reforms introducing
flexibility at the margins. For new jobs, “non-standard”
contracts have been introduced as a less costly and more
FIGURE 1
Latin America (selected countries): Employment trends in the 1990s
(Share in employment growth)
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flexible alternative to the open-ended contracts that
were once the norm. The resultant increase in flexibil-
ity and reduction in labour costs were expected to lead
to growth in the number of waged jobs created.
In the 1990s waged employment did indeed in-
crease more rapidly than total employment, suggest-
ing that the reform produced incentives to hiring. How-
ever, the social cost involved was increasing insecurity
of employment. The introduction of “non-standard”
labour contracts was accompanied by an increase in
the number of workers without any written employ-
ment contract at all. It should be noted that neither non-
standard contracts nor the lack of any written legal con-
tract automatically entail lower labour protection than
standard contracts. Only the reform in Argentina made
allowance for this reduction in temporary contracts, the
existence of an employment relationship being subject
to proof in the absence of a written contract. However,
inspection and control become more difficult with tem-
porary contracts. In the case of workers without con-
tracts, many are unofficial and work for cash, so that
their conditions of employment are almost impossible
to check. This development, furthermore, has come
about in a situation where labour inspection is gener-
ally weak, and because it is rigid contracts that are le-
gally recognized as standard ones, the reform has meant
that powers of guidance have been diminished.
In 1996, workers without contracts or with “non-
standard” contracts accounted for 30% of all workers
in Chile, 40% in Argentina and Colombia and 74% in
Peru. Most worked in microenterprises: 50% in Chile,
65-70% in Argentina and Colombia and 80% in Peru.
However, medium-sized and large enterprises recorded
the largest proportion of “non-standard” contracts and
significant percentages of workers without contracts:
6% in Chile, 11% in Peru and 32% in Argentina and
Colombia. In the case of microenterprises, informal
working and lack of employment security have a clear
tendency to overlap, since both are mainly the result of
inability to pay the costs of labour protection. With
larger enterprises, the number of unregistered workers
is an indication that the law is being circumvented
(Tokman and Martínez, eds., 1999).
Not only is the proportion of workers potentially
or actually exposed to insecure employment conditions
high, but in most countries insecure employment ac-
counts for all job growth in the 1990s. Of the four coun-
tries analysed, only in Colombia was there an increase
in open-ended employment; in Argentina, Chile and
Peru there was a fall in the absolute numbers of such
contracts. The exact nature of the transition from per-
manent to temporary employment differed from coun-
try to country. In Argentina, the decline in the number
of open-ended contracts was entirely offset by growth
in the number of workers without contracts, mainly in
larger enterprises. In Peru, the decline in open-ended
employment was compensated for in equal proportions
by workers with temporary contracts and workers with-
out contracts, mostly in microenterprises. In Chile, most
new jobs were provided by larger enterprises under tem-
porary contracts.
The four processes described resulted in a decline
in the quality of labour protection in the 1990s.
Privatization, which could have been a positive devel-
opment, was not so because of the inadequacy of job
creation in modern private-sector companies. A shift
towards tertiary employment is also a priori neutral,
since good jobs in services could make up for a decline
in available manufacturing employment. However, most
of the new jobs in services were of low productivity.
Increased informal working and insecure employment
conditions clearly resulted in lower job quality, although
this was somewhat offset by the rapid expansion of
employment in microenterprises.
The changes in the employment structure can be
more clearly identified if looked at from a longer-term
perspective. As can be seen in figure 2,2 during the three
decades prior to adjustment (1950-1980) an average of
2
 Owing to the nature of the available data, in the case of some
countries the informal sector as defined for the purposes of figure
2 includes microbusinesses with up to 10 employees, and its em-
ployment share relates to urban employment. The revised series,
in which the informal sector includes microbusinesses with up to
five employees and is related to urban employment, does not per-
mit of long-term comparison.
FIGURE 2
Latin America (selected countries): Sectoral
contribution to job creation, 1950-1996
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60% of new jobs in Latin America were created by the
formal sectors of the economy, with government ac-
counting for 15% and medium-sized and large private-
sector companies for 45%. The informal sector con-
tributed 40% of new jobs, of which only 10% were in
microenterprises (ILO, 1996).
A substantial change in the employment structure
occurred during the adjustment decade of the 1980s.
The contribution made by employment in modern in-
dustries fell to two out of every ten new jobs, this de-
cline being most pronounced in modern private-sector
companies that had to adjust to a more open economy.
The informal sector acted as a buffer: it doubled its
contribution to job creation, mostly in microenterprises,
where it more than tripled. The 1990s saw a recovery
in labour absorption in larger private-sector companies
and continuing growth in informal employment.
To sum up, privatization has meant that public-
sector employment is no longer contributing to labour
absorption. Larger enterprises, while they have been
recovering from the adjustment decade, are still well
below the pre-adjustment level, and technological
change and decentralization of production and employ-
ment mean that they are unlikely to be able to return to
it. Indeed, business of all sizes account for the same
5.5 out of every 10 new jobs as they did in the pre-
adjustment period. The difference is that the main con-
tributors now are microenterprises (including small
enterprises). This being the case, and informal and in-
secure employment still being the norm in the sector,
this employment shift has led to a decline in job
quality.
d)  Wage trends and differentials
The adjustment process was expected to have two ef-
fects on wages. It was predicted that wage levels would
increase as productivity grew, while wage differentials
by skill level would narrow as the demand for unskilled
labour increased because of the expansion of trade
based on labour-intensive sectors.
In 1990, both industrial and minimum wage lev-
els were lower in real terms than they had been in
1980. In both cases, though, there was a recovery
during the 1990s. This was mainly due to success in
reducing inflation, which declined from three digits
to less than 10% on average across Latin America.
Latterly, productivity growth also contributed, particu-
larly in the industrial sector. Nonetheless, as table 2
shows, minimum wages are still substantially lower
than in 1980.
Wage differentials have behaved in an unexpected
manner, with the gaps between minimum and indus-
trial wages and differences by skill or educational level
tending to widen. Industrial wages grew by 1.4% a year
between 1990 and 1997, while minimum wages in-
creased by only 0.3%. Across Latin America, income
differentials between professional and technical work-
ers and those employed in low-productivity sectors in-
creased from 40% to 60% on average between 1990
and 1994. This was the result of substantial growth in
the real incomes of high-skilled workers in modern ac-
tivities and slow increases or even declines in the wages
of unskilled labour in low-productivity sectors. In eight
out of ten countries for which data were available, the
wage gap by skill level widened (ECLAC, 1997a). The
same can also be seen when the wages of skilled work-
ers are compared with those of blue-collar workers since
1988 (IDB, 1998).
As wage gaps in Latin America widened over this
period, exactly the opposite trend was being seen in
the South-East Asian countries, despite the fact that in
1980 wage gaps in Latin America were already the larg-
est in the world. By 1997, the wage gap in Latin
America was 1.9 times as high as in developed coun-
tries and the South-East Asian countries.
A number of explanations can be put forward for
this unexpected development. The effect of capital lib-
eralization on the prices of capital goods could have
brought about an increase in investment and a concomi-
tant demand for skilled labour. The expansion of im-
ports from countries like China with an even greater
abundance of unskilled labour than Latin America, and
currency appreciation, which favoured growth in more
skill-intensive non-tradable goods, are other factors
(Lustig, 1998).
In addition, studies done on Brazil, Chile and Peru
(Meller and Tokman, 1996; Paes de Barros and others,
1996 and Saavedra, 1996) suggest that the maturity and
characteristics of the trade liberalization process influ-
ence the evolution of wage differentials. In Chile, where
the liberalization process was at a more mature stage,
large enterprises were able to expand employment af-
ter 1984; in Brazil and Peru (two late starters in the
process), large enterprises reduced employment in order
to raise productivity and competitiveness, while most
labour absorption took place in small enterprises and
microenterprises. In Chile demand for skilled labour
grew, while in the other two countries there was a shift
of labour from higher- to lower-productivity enterprises
and sectors, a process that was accompanied by net em-
ployment growth in Peru but a net contraction in Brazil.
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In both cases, however, wages for unskilled labour de-
clined, either as a result of this employment shift or be-
cause of the introduction of lower levels of labour pro-
tection. Workers in microenterprises earn an average
of 30% to 50% less than those in larger establishments
(ILO, 1997a), and the figure is still 20% even when per-
sonal characteristics are homogenized (IDB, 1998).
However, large companies replacing workers on long-
term contracts with temporary ones reduce wages by
between 35% and 40%, and by an additional 15% to
30% if no written contract is drawn up (table 4). It is
mainly unskilled workers who are switched to employment
contracts of this type, and this practice has neutralized
any demand effect that may have resulted from trade
liberalization (ILO, 1998).
e) Poverty and equity
Poverty and inequality have increased during the reform
process. Today, on average, there are more poor people
and income differences are larger in Latin America than
before. The trend has not been a continuous one. During
the 1990s, when several countries had already completed
the stabilization and trade liberalization phases, poverty
fell in most of the countries for which data are available.
Only in Argentina and Venezuela did the level of pov-
erty rise, while in Mexico it remained constant. In the
13 remaining countries for which there are data, reported
poverty fell (ECLAC, 1999).
The level of poverty is still higher today than in
1980, and there has been no improvement in equity.
On the contrary, income concentration has increased
substantially since the early 1980s, so that the Gini
coefficient is now at a level similar to that seen in
1970 (0.52). This is because the income share of the
poorest quintile has declined while that of the highest
quintile has risen continuously, a rise that was inter-
rupted only between 1980 and 1983. The intermediate
quintiles, while performing better than the poorest, have
still not recovered the income shares they had at the be-
ginning of the 1980s. In fact, of the two countries (Chile
and Uruguay) that can show a significant decrease in
poverty, only in Uruguay has equity increased at the same
time.
Income concentration in Latin America has his-
torically been the highest in the world. At present, the
income share of the top 5% is double that of the same
group in industrialized countries, and more than 60%
higher than in South-East Asian countries. At the other
extreme, the income share of the poorest 30%, at 7.5%,
is the lowest in the world, being just 60% of the equiva-
lent level in industrialized and Asian countries (IDB,
1998). When a successful performer like Chile is com-
pared to the United States, it is found that the income
shares of the bottom 20% are similar (about 4.5%).
However, to find a time when the shares of the upper
20% were comparable, we have to go back as far as
1929. If the Gini coefficient is calculated for 90% of
the Latin American population (excluding the upper
10%) it is found to average 0.36, which is similar to
the level seen in the United States, while in six of the
countries it is actually lower than in the United States
(IDB, 1998). This clearly shows that greater income
concentration among the highest groups is a key ex-
planatory factor.
Of no less importance is the question of why glo-
balization, and the adjustment package that accompa-
nied it, did not help to bring Latin American equity
levels closer to those of the rest of the world. Conven-
tional wisdom, based on the pioneering studies of
Kuznets, would lead one to expect that, after a period
TABLE 4
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru: Insecure employment
Waged workersa Hourly cost of labourb Composition of changes in waged employmentc
On Without Total With Without With Open-ended Temporary Without Total change
temporary contracts temporary contracts open contracts contracts contracts in waged
contracts contracts -ended employment
contracts
Argentina 12.7 33.0 35.7 3.5 2.8 6.1 -652.7 25.7 726.9 100.0
Chile 14.7 15.6 30.3 1.4 1.0 2.1 -89.9 138.9 51.0 100.0
Colombia 8.3 31.0 39.3 1.9 1.6 3.3 81.9 13.3 4.8 100.0
Peru 32.6 41.1 73.7 1.4 1.1 2.1 -19.3 56.8 62.6 100.0
Source: Tokman and Martínez (eds.) (1999) and ILO (1998).
a As percentages of total waged employment.
b In dollars.
c As percentages of changes in waged employment between 1990 and 1996.
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of increased income concentration in the early stage of
development, equity would improve. This conventional
wisdom does not seem to hold today, even for devel-
oped countries. The trend towards greater equity has
been cut short or, at best, suspended. Inequality has
increased in the United States since the end of the 1960s,
while in the United Kingdom it increased from 1979 to
1989, and it likewise rose in Sweden after 1988
(Atkinson, 1996 and Krugman, 1995). This suggests
that Latin American countries may be following a uni-
versal path as a result of policy homogenization, with-
out having passed through the stage of increased eq-
uity seen earlier in those countries.
Several factors can help explain why globalization
has not improved equity in Latin America. They relate
to population dynamics, the distribution of opportuni-
ties and the workings of labour markets during the ad-
justment process.
Rapid population growth has resulted, particularly
in poor households, in larger household size (50% more
members in the lowest quintile than in the highest),
higher dependency rates (almost treble) and lower par-
ticipation rates (60%) (ECLAC, 1997a).
Access to opportunities, and particularly to edu-
cation, is also unequal. Although the time people spend
in education has increased on average (albeit more
slowly than in South-East Asian countries), it tends
to be unequally distributed. There is a high drop-out
rate among poor households. While 94% of poor chil-
dren in educationally advanced countries are enrolled
in the first year of school, the figure is only 76% in
the less advanced countries. Enrolment rates decrease
to 63% and 32% by the fifth year, and to 15% and 6%
by the ninth year. Entry rates are similar for poor chil-
dren and children from higher-income families, but
the latter remain at school for longer periods. By the
fifth year, the rates are 93% and 83%, while by the
ninth year they are 58% and 49% (IDB, 1998). Inequal-
ity of access is reinforced by higher rates of educa-
tion to university level among higher-income fami-
lies and by differences in education quality. Academic
attainments (in mathematics and science) are on av-
erage 50% higher in private schools, which are at-
tended only by children from higher-income families,
than in State schools, which 90% of the children of
the poor attend.
A significant proportion of income differences,
more than 55%, is explained by labour market out-
comes. As argued above, increased unemployment,
employment shifts towards less productive, more un-
stable jobs and increased wage differentials tend to
widen income inequalities since they affect poor house-
holds disproportionately. Unemployment rates are
higher in poor households (in Chile the rate for the
poorest quintile was 2.7 times that for the richest
quintile in 1996). In addition, job allocation is seg-
mented. High-quality, well-paid jobs are largely held
by members of higher-income families, while low-qual-
TABLE 5
Latin America (nine countries): Indicators of employment transformation,
informal working and average income growth by income groupa
(Percentages and annual growth rates)
Country Period Employmentb Informal workingc Average income
of the employedd
Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High
Argentina (1990-96) 0.5 1.0 1.2 -1.3 66 79 77 ... 4.5 3.5 4.2 6.4
Brazil (1992-95) 3.5 5.8 2.2 3.5 81 66 85 95 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5
Chile (1990-96) 3.1 3.8 2.7 2.9 29 14 30 42 5.6 4.1 5.8 5.9
Colombia (1992-96) 1.8 1.2 1.9 2.6 37 ... 66 22 3.6 2.5 3.3 3.9
Costa Rica (1990-95) 4.4 3.7 3.5 7.0 51 70 48 42 1.9 -0.6 1.4 2.7
Mexico (1990-95) 6.4 7.8 6.0 5.5 58 87 54 18 -2.1 -3.8 -2.1 0.2
Panama (1989-95) 6.8 6.3 7.2 6.8 38 45 35 31 1.4 2.6 0.6 2.2
Peru (1991-95) 5.1 6.3 4.2 5.4 69 97 51 32 3.0 2.7 -0.2 3.0
Venezuela (1990-96) 2.6 2.3 2.2 3.8 77 100 87 31 -10.3 -11.5 -9.8 -9.1
Source: ILO, on the basis of household surveys in Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires), Brazil (urban area), Chile (urban area), Colombia (10 metropoli-
tan areas), Costa Rica (urban area), Mexico (39 cities), Panama (metropolitan area), Peru (metropolitan Lima) and Venezuela (urban area).
a Data refer to those employed in urban areas, excluding the agricultural and mining sectors. Workers have been grouped according to
income levels as determined by per capita household income quintiles. The income levels are: low (quintile I + quintile II), medium
(quintile III + quintile IV) and high (quintile V). All indicators relate to the period shown for each country.
b Annual rate of employment growth (average for the period shown for each country).
c Percentage of new jobs in informal activities during the period shown for each country.
d Annual rate of average income growth for those in work, measured in constant prices (average for the period shown for each country).
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ity, informal and unskilled jobs tend to be taken up by
people from poor households. Employment among the
poorest 40% in Chile increased between 1992 and 1994;
while formal employment declined, the number of in-
formal jobs grew by more than 20%. The opposite hap-
pened in the upper quintile, where formal employment
expanded by 13.5% and informal employment de-
creased by 2.7%. More than half of all new jobs re-
quiring high educational levels went to upper-income
families, while upward mobility among the bottom 40%
was limited, as they tended to take up jobs with sec-
ondary or technical requirements (Tokman, 1998).
Labour market outcomes are a key factor in the de-
velopment of poverty and equity. This does not mean that
non-work incomes are not important, but that the two can-
not be considered in isolation from one another. Income
concentration by household is currently similar to the con-
centration of earnings by worker in 14 Latin American
countries (with Gini coefficients of 0.52 and 0.51 respec-
tively) (IDB, 1998). The above analysis, then, can be trans-
lated into poverty and equity, and we have done this for
nine countries in the 1990s (tables 5 and 6). The countries
included were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela (ILO, 1997a).
TABLE 6








1990 7.9 34.6 57.5 7.0
1996 6.8 35.4 57.8 8.0
Change -1.1 0.8 0.3
Brazil
1992 5.1 29.2 65.7 19.2
1995 5.3 27.3 67.4 21.5
Change 0.2 -1.9 1.7
Chile
1990 11.3 30.7 58.0 9.4
1996 10.8 30.6 58.6 10.4
Change -0.5 -0.1 0.6
Colombia
1992 16.8 33.5 49.7 4.3
1996 15.6 33.0 51.4 4.6
Change -1.2 -0.5 1.7
Costa Rica
1990 19.2 41.6 39.2 3.0
1995 15.8 38.7 45.5 3.4
Change -3.4 -2.9 6.3
Mexico
1990 15.0 37.5 47.5 6.0
1995 14.3 35.9 49.8 7.1
Change -0.7 -1.6 2.3
Panama
1989 14.3 37.7 48.0 4.7
1995 14.7 35.9 49.4 4.7
Change 0.4 -1.8 1.4
Peru
1991 13.2 34.7 52.1 7.9
1995 14.2 30.9 54.9 8.5
Change 1.0 -3.8 2.8
Venezuela
1990 18.4 38.5 43.1 4.7
1996 13.6 39.0 47.4 7.6
Change -4.8 0.5 4.3
Source: ILO, on the basis of household surveys in Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires), Brazil (urban area), Chile (urban area), Colombia (10
metropolitan areas), Costa Rica (urban area), Mexico (39 cities), Panama (metropolitan area), Peru (metropolitan Lima) and Venezuela
(urban area).
a Constant prices.
b The inequality ratio measures the relationship between the nominal average incomes of the highest level (quintile V) and the lowest
level (quintiles I and II).
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On average, in the nine countries included, both
employment and income per worker increased in the
1990s, but the distribution of income favoured the up-
per 20% of families. Employment grew fastest in poor
households, followed by households in the upper 20%
of income. Middle-income groups benefited the least
(figure 3). Average income, however, grew most rap-
idly in the higher income group, less rapidly in the
middle and most slowly among poor households. This
is a consequence of segmented access to jobs by dif-
ferent income groups. The poor, lacking in human capi-
tal, tend to get access to informal jobs, while higher-
income families tend to take up better jobs. About 70
out of every 100 new jobs taken up by the poorest 40%
were informal, while in the case of the middle 40% the
ratio was 52 out of every 100 new jobs. As a result,
income concentration, as measured by the income dif-
ference between the top 20% and the bottom 40%, in-
creased in all the countries considered. Both the poor
and the intermediate groups saw their share of total
income diminish, the upper 20% being the only gain-
ers. It seems likely, however, that relative poverty de-
creased. Growth in employment and in earnings per
worker, plus an increase in the number of family mem-
bers at work, resulted in higher incomes for the poor
and lower poverty in most countries during this period,
the exceptions being Mexico and Venezuela.
The situation is fairly homogeneous across all the
countries. Incomes per worker grew fastest in the
upper-income group in all the nine countries consid-
ered, and employment did so in six of them. The situa-
tion as regards developments in the poor and middle
groups is more diverse. In most countries, employment
grew more rapidly for the poorest 40% than for the
middle 40%. However, income per worker grew faster
for the middle-income group than for the low-income
group in six of the nine countries studied. As noted
earlier, this was the result of differentiated access to
jobs. Income differentials between the top 20% and the
bottom 40% increased in all cases, with the cost being
borne by the poor and middle groups. In half the
countries the poor lost more ground than the middle
group, while in the remainder the reverse was true.
FIGURE 3
Latin America (selected countries): Employment
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III
Adjustment, global economies and
social stratification
Both the adjustment process in national economies
and the subsequent integration of these into the in-
ternational economy have had a significant impact
on the social stratification system. This is because
that system is mainly based on an occupational struc-
ture that has changed to reflect the transformations
wrought in the labour market by economic restruc-
turing. Some of the changes that have taken place,
and the sociological consequences of these, will be
analysed below, with particular attention being paid
to four aspects. The first is the relationship between
the transformation of public employment and middle
class impoverishment. The second is the way
privatization generates increased social heterogene-
ity, as a result of both involuntary labour mobility
and the growth of outsourcing. The third is the in-
fluence of transnationalization on labour relation
systems. Lastly, we shall look at the increased dif-
ferentiation emerging in employment growth areas,
like microenterprise and agriculture.
1. Public-sector employment and the middle class
The first important issue is the new role of the State
and its impact on the labour market. This transforma-
tion has had two main effects. In the first instance, public-
sector employment has declined in virtually all the
countries of the region. On average, public-sector em-
ployment has decreased from 16% of the economically
active population at the beginning of the 1980s to 13%
today, a fall of almost 20%. This average masks par-
ticularly steep drops in some countries. For example,
between 1990 and 1997 public-sector employment de-
creased by 32% in Argentina, 33% in Bolivia, 22% in
Costa Rica and 28% in Panama. This process has had a
large influence on social stratification in Latin America.
It is a well documented fact that the origins and devel-
opment of the middle class in Latin America were
closely associated with the role of the State in promot-
ing social and economic development during this cen-
tury. In some countries this process began in the early
decades of the century, in others it took place after the
Second World War, and in others again it is still going
on, but it is a feature of the entire region. This role
encompassed the creation of public employment and
the hiring of administrative staff to implement the de-
velopment policies of the State, including health, edu-
cation, public works and housing. The State was in-
volved in creating employment in public enterprises of
all kinds, but essentially in those sectors deemed to be
of national strategic importance (utilities, key natural
resources and basic industries). One illustration of the
importance of public-sector employment to the devel-
opment of the middle class is the observation
(Echeverría, 1985) that, in the 1970s, 60% of all Latin
American professionals were civil servants.
The occupational status of civil servants who have
lost their jobs as a result of the decline in public-sector
employment is unclear, and probably varies between
and within countries. In some instances former civil
servants have been eligible to receive compensation
payments, with which they have been able to start their
own businesses, usually as independent contractors or
as micro-entrepreneurs. In many of these cases their
position may have improved. In other cases, these re-
dundancies have led to downward mobility. The fact is
that, in some countries, people discharged from the civil
service and public-sector enterprises have experienced
impoverishment and loss of status, especially those who
were not professionals and whose status was based not
on their educational attainments but on the occupational
positions they held.
Again, those who have remained in public employ-
ment have also lost status. With the economic adjust-
ment measures that have been taken, the importance of
State administration has been reduced. At the same time,
the prevailing ideological standpoint plays down the
role of the State in society, and public functions do not
have the same prestige as before. One indication of this
is the reduced remuneration now given to civil servants;
during the 1980s, the salaries of public employees fell
by an average of 30% (ILO, 1992).
Of course, civil servants still enjoy considerable
employment stability, coupled with a certain amount
of social protection and safety nets that, even though
they are far from satisfactory, provide some security
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from the most pronounced of the negative trends oper-
ating in today’s labour market. Furthermore, not all the
remaining civil servants have seen their position worsen.
One group, albeit small, have improved their incomes
and status because they have been given increased re-
sponsibilities and because demand from the private
sector for their type of specialization is high. This is
particularly true of those working for essential institu-
tions in the new economic system, such as those in
charge of overseeing and collecting tax revenues or
customs duties. It is also true of those with a regulatory
role in different areas of the financial system such as
banking, insurance and stock markets, and in the insti-
tutions created to regulate privatized social security
activities and utilities. As a result, wage and status dif-
ferentials have widened in what used to be a very ho-
mogeneous sector. The increasingly heterogeneous
character of the sector is not necessarily a negative fea-
ture. Indeed, it may lead to greater economic efficiency
in the public sector if incentives related to labour pro-
ductivity are introduced, as in fact is happening in ar-
eas like education and health. Furthermore, if a highly
skilled labour force can be retained in the civil service
by keeping wages and working conditions competitive
with the private sector, then the quality of the product
will improve. Creating opportunities for social mobil-
ity and higher status for some of those working in the
public sector by allowing wage differentials to increase
can result in improvements to the overall performance
of the sector.
2. Social heterogeneity and privatization of
public enterprises
The second feature of the changed role of the State is
the privatization of public-sector enterprises that has
taken place throughout Latin America. Privatization has
had a major impact on the way the labour market works,
particularly where certain of its institutional character-
istics are concerned. Labour market flexibility has been
achieved by various means. The first is greater scope
to dismiss workers. In almost all public enterprises that
have been privatized, a proportion of the labour force
has been made redundant, the result in the first instance
being an increase in open unemployment. This process,
of course, is similar to the one seen in the private sec-
tor. Some of these workers have not been able to find
stable work and have become downwardly mobile, al-
ternating between periods of underemployment and
unemployment. Others have found employment simi-
lar to the work they did for the public-sector enterprises
concerned. Lastly, the rest have turned themselves into
entrepreneurs, creating businesses of their own that in
many cases have functional links to the large compa-
nies they were formerly employed by. In other words,
when workers and employees in general are dismissed
from newly privatized enterprises, some of their former
functions, including some essential ones, are
outsourced, and these enterprises subcontract with
smaller firms for this work. In this way, a subcontract-
ing chain is established. This arrangement has tradi-
tionally been quite common in some economic sectors,
construction being an example. Today, it is also to be
found in the primary sectors, basic utilities, telecom-
munications, commerce and financial services.
Outsourcing gives companies greater flexibility,
enabling them to respond appropriately to fluctuations
in the economic environment. Although there has been
no thorough macro-evaluation in respect of income and
employment, national case studies show that the im-
pact is heterogeneous. For example, in the Chilean State
mining sector, where extensive redundancies have been
made to reduce production costs, many workers have
been rehired on a subcontracting basis. While they have
indeed forfeited employment stability and significant
non-wage benefits, working conditions and accident
rates have improved (ILO, 1997b). On the other hand,
in many other cases income and employment condi-
tions have deteriorated. Insecure employment abounds
in different sectors and countries where subcontract-
ing is becoming a common feature of the labour mar-
ket. In these cases, temporary jobs, lack of social secu-
rity coverage and the absence of unions, collective
bargaining and training mechanisms may well be the
norm, even though wages might be higher.
3. Transnational enterprises and their social
effects
Privatization of State enterprises has also increased the
presence of transnational corporations. This has gen-
erated a new managerial stratum, characterized by very
high incomes, an international outlook (as opposed to
national interests) and a corporate ideology based on
the idea that globalization redefines national bound-
aries and local interests. This stratum is to be found not
only in privatized public enterprises but also in private
companies, particularly those engaged in trading, fi-
nancial services and industry. One of the effects of the
transnational status and management style of these
managers is that they tend to apply international stan-
dards to labour relations, without recognizing national
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and local characteristics. Often they are also sharehold-
ers in the company, which gives them a concrete stake
in its interests. They are also involved, however, in
making the whole economic system work at a macro
level, insofar as events in the capital and financial mar-
kets directly affect their own overall incomes (in coun-
tries where privatized pension funds have been allowed
to invest in shares, this is also the case for all workers
and employees participating in the system).
One specific kind of transnational presence is the
so-called maquila or inbond assembly system whereby
certain parts of a company’s production process are
transferred to another country, this usually being justi-
fied in terms of lower labour costs as these have a large
direct effect on total production costs (labour accounts
for 54% of total costs in the typical Central American
maquila or inbond assembly plant, where labour costs
are 3.5 times lower than in the United States). In some
areas of Latin America, this form of production is in-
creasingly important. In Central America, plants of this
type now account for 250,000 jobs (400,000 if the
Dominican Republic is included), representing 30% of
employment in the formal industrial sector, 20% of
export value added and about 10% of industrial GNP
(Gitli, 1997). Their impact, then, has been significant,
and in some cases particularly disadvantaged groups
in the labour market, mainly women, have benefited
from the presence of these plants in their respective
countries. This has become a means of increasing labour
force participation among these groups, which consti-
tute a social stratum that is clearly dependent on the
transnational activities increasingly being undertaken
by firms from the developed world as national econo-
mies globalize.
The same study shows, however, that labour stan-
dards and even human rights are not always respected.
Sweatshops are widespread, even though there is in-
creasing pressure for foreign firms to comply with mini-
mum standards in their host countries. The question
that remains to be answered is whether this is at all
possible when low labour costs are the driving force
behind the very existence of the inbond assembly in-
dustry.
4. Microenterprises and the informal sector
Microenterprises, many of them informal, have by and
large been the main source of employment in Latin
America during the last decade. The social effects of
this trend have been important. To begin with, it has
weakened the waged workforce that traditionally sus-
tained the labour movement. Permanent blue-collar
workers in medium-sized and large industrial compa-
nies have increasingly been outnumbered by wage earn-
ers in microenterprises. Others have been turned into
independent contractors, mainly in the trade and ser-
vices sectors.
The way microenterprises have developed has, in
many cases, reflected their relationship with the inter-
national economy. While a large majority of
microenterprises cater to national markets, a propor-
tion are now linked through exports to the world
economy. Some authors have argued that this “neo-in-
formality” is a characteristic of today’s labour markets,
particularly when enterprises form part of subcontract-
ing chains with the inbond assembly operations of for-
eign companies, and when they have found specific
niches in particular external markets (Pérez-Sáinz,
1996). In none of them, though, is there a significant
division between labour and capital.
At this point it is worth recalling that up until the
1970s the evolution of social stratification in Latin
America was a relatively straightforward process in
which the labour force clearly experienced structural
social mobility. Indeed, research carried out by
Germani, Stavenhagen and Medina Echeverría, among
others, suggests there was a long-standing trend of up-
ward mobility from low-productivity occupations to
higher-productivity ones, interpreted as being chiefly
a shift between sectors (from agriculture to manufac-
turing and services) and between occupational catego-
ries (from blue-collar to non-manual) (see Filgueira and
Geneletti, 1981).
This seems no longer to be the case. The position
of the present paper is that one of the results of adjust-
ment policies and the globalization of national econo-
mies has been the emergence of heterogeneous char-
acteristics within segments of the labour market, and
this phenomenon is seen most clearly when the
microenterprise sector is analysed. “Small scale” means
many different things in both economic and social
terms. Some microenterprises are highly capitalized,
have links to dynamic markets, operate in leading sec-
tors and employ increasingly highly qualified
workforces, while others again are conventional in
terms of capital and labour use. Hence, heterogeneity
is increasing as a result of current economic develop-
ments: those employed in enterprises that are linked to
the developed strata have benefited in terms of income
and employment opportunities (although not necessar-
ily as regards employment quality), while those who
remain cut off from the main thrust of the economy
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have lagged behind. They continue to work in low-pro-
ductivity occupations, with low skills and little job se-
curity.
5. Sectoral analysis
Heterogeneous trends in the labour market, and the so-
cial impact these give rise to, can also be observed at
the sectoral level. Social strata will vary according to
the way businesses are linked with the rest of the
economy (national and international). The development
of agriculture clearly illustrates this point. Those agro-
industrial sectors that have grown on the basis of exter-
nal markets require a type of labour force different to
that employed in traditional agriculture, and have gen-
erated a new set of occupations. Firstly, they require a
relatively well trained and highly skilled labour force.
Secondly, the jobs they generate are mostly temporary.
Thirdly, they have opened up new waged employment
options for people who were previously unemployed
and/or not economically active, particularly women,
whose increased participation in the labour market has
led to changes in the organization of the family and the
distribution of roles within it. Lastly, most of these jobs
are remunerated according to labour productivity. These
characteristics contrast strongly with those of the tra-
ditional worker, the permanent, low-skilled male wage
earner, employed in the cultivation of traditional crops
and earning, if he is lucky, the minimum wage. Within
a single occupational category, therefore, the jobs avail-
able have become more diverse in terms of the
workforce required, the personal characteristics of this
workforce, productivity standards and time spent in the
labour market. To sum up, we can say that heterogene-
ity has been a traditional feature of agriculture, an ex-
ample of this being the coexistence of plantations and
a peasant economy. The difference today is that this
heterogeneity is also to be found within occupational
categories so that, for example, the characteristics of
waged labour vary depending on whether or not the




Globalization cannot be isolated from the other poli-
cies that have accompanied it over the last twenty years.
They constitute a policy compact that it is very diffi-
cult, both analytically and in practice, to break down
into its constituent parts. Three processes have been
scrutinized: globalization, privatization and deregula-
tion. The effects on social stratification, mainly through
labour market outcomes, have been the focus of our
analysis, because the occupational structure is the ba-
sis of the system of stratification.
The main conclusion is that the social structure in
Latin America has been placed under tension during
the reform period. This tension has affected social co-
hesion and introduced greater heterogeneity. As with
all processes, there are winners and losers. The differ-
ence this time is that the changes are substantial and
will have a structural effect on peoples, societies and
nations not only today but into the future.
Change, particularly during the 1990s, has not all
been for the worse. Poverty is on a declining trend, and
the poor are better off in income terms. However, eq-
uity has deteriorated. The winners are a minority, while
the rest, not only the poor but middle-income groups
as well, increasingly lag behind in relative terms. The
effects of the policy compact on employment and earn-
ings, as well as on equality of opportunities, have proven
to be an important determinant of this outcome. In a
region where inequality is already the highest in the
world, this is an unwelcome trend.
There seems to be enough evidence to sustain the
proposition that the policy compact has led to greater
concentration. Most of the positive effects have ben-
efited sectors that were already situated in the upper
echelons of income distribution: the policy compact
has favoured the relatively rich. Those negative effects
that have occurred in the labour market as a result of
the policy compact –increasingly insecure working
conditions (lack of contracts, social protection, etc.),
the shift of employment towards the service sector and
informal jobs, unemployment– have mostly been con-
centrated among sectors that were already relatively
poor. Thus, differences have increased. Wage earners
may actually be paid more now than in the recent past,
but their jobs are in many instances more informal and
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less secure. In these cases, workers’ status has changed
for the worse.
The middle stratum has also experienced decreased
levels of welfare. This paper has described the nega-
tive effects of the compact on public-sector employ-
ment, and the ensuing effects on social stratification. It
should also be added that the benefits of social policies
have diminished, insofar as these policies have become
more focused on the poor at the expense of middle-
income groups. As a consequence, the middle classes
now have less protection against unemployment and
poor working conditions, public transfers (in the form
of monetary benefits) have diminished and many oc-
cupations that hitherto provided them with status have
either lost their social significance or disappeared alto-
gether.
This unequal distribution of gains and losses seems
even more regrettable in view of the high hopes being
placed in the positive effects of globalization –a path
to which all Latin American countries adhered from
the early stages– on growth, equity and social integra-
tion. The issue, however, is how far globalization has
brought additional distortions to an already unbalanced
social situation. To place this in the right perspective, it
should be recalled that the starting point from which
globalization set out was not conducive to a process of
social adjustment, since high income concentration and
severe macroeconomic imbalances limited any posi-
tive effects that might have emerged from closer inte-
gration into the world economy. The analysis, then,
should focus more on the post-adjustment situation.
As has been shown, there have been fundamental
changes in the employment structure as well as in in-
comes and job quality. In most cases, people have found
that the direction of change has been downward. Un-
employment, a new feature of the situation, has also
contributed to social exclusion, while volatility, which
is associated with the workings of a more open
economy, has brought instability in jobs and incomes.
Unsurprisingly, the main fear of people in the region
today is for their jobs, the chief concerns being insta-
bility and loss of labour protection. Demands for in-
creased labour protection during times of adjustment
have been thwarted by the need to husband resources,
and particularly for Governments to correct fiscal im-
balances.
Globalization has brought new dimensions to eco-
nomic analysis of labour markets, given their increased
links to trade, finance and communications at the in-
ternational level. The old centre-periphery analysis,
which has strongly influenced the Latin American in-
tellectual tradition, is giving way to dependence and
marginality analysis. Linkages today are not only closer
but also of a different nature. Heterogeneity has in-
creased.
A direct way of looking at this relationship is to
identify population groups that are more closely linked
to the global economy than to the country in which
they live. A case that provides an interesting illustra-
tion of this situation is that of Mexico, which of all the
countries in the region has perhaps been one of the most
exposed to globalization in the recent past. Castañeda
(1996) identifies four groups that are directly depen-
dent on economic developments in the United States,
totalling between them 20% to 25% of the Mexican
population. Mexican migrants living in the United
States are the first group. They constitute a source of
income for an estimated 10 million Mexican residents;
remittances, which have grown exponentially, are an
important contribution to the budgets of poor families
(it is estimated that in 1998 they totalled US$ 5.5 billion,
having tripled since 1990). A second group is involved
with exports, including inbond assembly exports, which
are produced by 2,500 establishments and benefit a
further two million people, plus other export-related
activities in agriculture and manufacturing industry.
Several examples serve to illustrate this. General Mo-
tors of Mexico, the country’s biggest private-sector ex-
porter, sells 40% more cars abroad than in the domes-
tic market. Corona, the main beer producer, sells one
bottle abroad for each bottle that goes to the internal
market, and Cementos Mexicanos exported 90% of its
output in 1993. A third group whose livelihood depends
on foreigners consists of those working in the tourism
sector. It is estimated that 600,000 Mexicans are em-
ployed in this activity and hence insulated from fluc-
tuations in the domestic economy. Lastly, a large num-
ber of people have links with foreign countries as legal
or illegal property owners, or simply because they save,
own assets, use financial instruments (like credit cards)
or study or temporarily work abroad in professional
and technical jobs.
Castañeda’s analysis can be extended to the rest of
Latin America, with different proportions involved but
with similar types of relationships. Our own analysis
shows, though, that not all sectors or all occupations
within sectors have become global. The effects have
not been homogeneous. Not all sectors have been
equally affected, and within sectors the impact has been
differentiated. Parts of industry have integrated into the
world economy, while others have lagged behind; agro-
industry, for instance, has established strong links with
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international markets, while traditional peasant agri-
culture has remained autonomous. Occupations have
become more heterogeneous, both between and within
sectors. This is particularly the case with the inbond
assembly industry, tourism and subcontracting in
manufacturing industry. Businesses and hence owners,
managers, technicians and skilled labour are incor-
porated into the global economy; unskilled workers,
while better off than before, are in an insecure posi-
tion characterized by poor incomes, instability and
lack of protection. Unemployment has added to social
exclusion, particularly among women and young
people.
Changes in the social structure have resulted from
labour market effects; the differences between differ-
ent population groups in the degree of global economic
integration go beyond jobs and incomes to permeate
social habits. Cultural and economic differences trans-
late into different social behaviour. Urban life is in-
creasingly segregated; there are now ghettos for the rich,
as there have traditionally been for the poor. Closed
areas, private security, exclusive malls and clubs and
even schools conspire against social integration. Pub-
lic spaces like parks and places of entertainment which
encouraged social interaction in the past are less avail-
able. Separate schools divide children by social groups
(Tokman and O’Donnell, eds., 1998). As O’Donnell
(1998) puts it:
‘The sharp, and deepening, dualism of our coun-
tries severely hinders the emergence of broad and ef-
fective solidarity. Social distances have increased, and
the rich tend to isolate themselves from the strange and
disquieting world of the dispossessed. The fortified
ghettos of the rich and the secluded schools of their
children bear witness to their incorporation into the
transnationalized networks of modernity, as well as to
the gulf that separates them from large segments of the
national population.’
Social categories –as key instruments in the analy-
sis of social stratification and social inclusion– are un-
dergoing fundamental conceptual change. As Castañeda
(1996) correctly argued, the issue today is not one of
class, or ideology, or regions. It is not one of class,
because the families of migrants or workers in some
export sectors benefit as owners and managers do. It is
not one of ideology, because ideas are now increas-
ingly exposed and sustained by transnational events in
what is a communications revolution. Nor is it a ques-
tion of North against South, since the new economic
situation and worldwide ideological change are blur-
ring the divisions of the past. It goes beyond all this.
Social groups are structured by occupations as they
were in the past, but sectors tend to lose meaning when
heterogeneity prevails and, more importantly, when
people relate in a different way, culturally and economi-
cally, to national and international interests.
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